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THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 
REFLECTIONS ON OUR PARTNERSHIP 
When I left Washington eight months ago my former 
colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee assured 
me I would be welcome to return at anytime to testify, and 
that they would try not to be too hard on me. I told them I 
intended to wait until I knew all the answers. After eight 
months on the job in Tokyo I certainly don't know all the 
answers -- although I think I have a better understanding of 
the nature of the questions. But I decided to come home 
anyway, and I hope you will be as kind as my Senate friends 
promised to be. The large and growing domestic dimension of 
our relations with Japan means that more and more Americans 
have a stake, and take an active interest, in our policy 
toward that country. I wanted to listen to some of those 
people -- in the Congress, in business, in the labor movement, 
and in the Administration -- and to talk to them about the 
way I see the US-Japan relationship. That is why I am here. 
78-lR 
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I have never subscribed to the definition of an Ambassador 
as an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country. In my 
eight months on the job I have tried to report accurately what 
• I have seen, and to give the Japanese Government -- and 
Washington -- straight talk. I promise to offer the same to 
you tonight. I have also tried to avoid one of the perils of 
diplomacy -- what they tell me i~ called "localitis" --
becoming so taken with the country to which one is accredited 
that judgement suffers and recommendations are warped. In 
Japan it is especially hard to avoid that pitfall. That 
country, like some others in Asia, exerts a powerful influence 
on those who live there. 
But while I believe my objectivity is still unimpaired, 
I admit to being an enthusiastic advocate -- as are all of 
you -- of the importance to this country and the world of our 
ties with Japan. And despite its basic strength, the US-Japan 
relationship needs enthusiastic advocates these days. 
This has not been an easy year in our relations with 
Japan, and undoubtedly we are not out of the woods yet. But 
we have come far enough to take stock to tally our successes, 
to acknowledge some mistakes, and perhaps to draw some 
conclusions which might serve as useful benchmarks for the 
future. 
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Before I get into what I see as the pluses and minuses 
of the past year in US-Japan relations, I want to talk briefly 
about East Asia as a whole. My portfolio is Japan, but you 
can't talk about Japan - - or any part of Asia -- without 
reference to the entire region. Most of the crucial issues 
in Japanese foreign policy are Asian issues, and those issue s 
form the prism through which Japan views its relationship 
with the United States. 1977 was an especially intriguing 
year in what for me has always been the most intriguing 
area of the world. 
In the People's Republic of China we have seen over t he 
past year an increasing turn toward pragmatism, its leadersh~p 
searching for ways to modernize its economy while paying 
relatively less heed to ideological purity. As modernizat ion 
progresses, the task of governing effectively so vast a s e gment 
of humanity may well grow more rather than less difficult . In 
pursuing modernization, and a climate of security in which 
modernization can succeed, China is likely to turn outward 
toward Japan, the United States and Europe for technology 
and trade and, to a degree, for tacit political support. 
In my judgment, it clearly behooves us -- Japan, the Uni ted 
States and Europe -- to be judiciously responsive. For we all 
have a profound interest in a stable, peaceful China, engaged 
productively in the international system. 
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The USSR of course is also a participant in the affairs 
of East Asia. While the non-communist nations of the region 
see it as a somewhat unnatural phenomenon, a Soviet presence, 
military and political, is increasingly a fact of life. 
Our own attitude toward that presence has been realistic 
we are concerned by Soviet activities and keep a careful 
watching brief, but we are not alarmed. East Asian nations 
themselves -- the PRC of course included are sufficiently 
wary of Soviet intentions that an effective limit is placed on 
the growth of Moscow's influence and disruptive potential in 
the region. But at the same time we have the vital responsi-
bility to maintain a strong and credible military force in 
East Asia -- one fully capable of sustaining the strategic 
equilibrium which has existed there in recent years, and with-
out which there could be great danger for the region and for 
the United States. 
The major testing ground of that equilibrium, now as 
always over the past 30 years, is Korea. The Korean peninsula 
remains the one area in East Asia -- and arguably in the world 
-- in which the interests of four major powers are so intimately 
juxtaposed and in which military conflict could prove so 
dangerous. Japan is of course uniquely sensitive to the 
situation in Korea and our p0licy toward it. 
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In Southeast Asia, the member states of ASEAN have made 
continued, impressive progress in economic development and 
regional cohesion. At the same time, I believe some Southeast 
Asians have been disturbed by what they perceive to be 
lessened us involvement in that region. They and Japan are 
establishing a relationship that promises great benefits to 
both sides -- but which both hope will be complemented by a 
US- ASEAN relationship of equal substance. 
Indochina is preoccupied with internal problems and 
harsh intraregional rivalries. Its immediate future is 
problematic -- clearly the priority of its governments logi-
cally should be upon economic development and resolution of 
its currently violent internal conflict. If logic prevails, 
as I hope it will, the prospect for a continued peaceful and 
eventually cooperative relationship between Indochina and the 
rest of Southeast Asia would seem good. If that does occur, 
Japan's carefully evenhanded diplomacy toward Indochina will 
have contributed significantly to the outcome. 
I would like to add one more observation about an aspect 
or E~St Asia especially pertinent in this era of declining 
energy resources. It is my personal view -- and one, I should 
acknowledge, which is not shared by some of our government 
experts in this field -- that the world's next, and perhaps 
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last, great oil find will be in East Asian waters. The 
results of exploration have been encouragina. There are 
indications of oil off the northwest coast of Sakhalin, in the 
Yellow Sea off the Gulf of Pohai, in the South China Sea, and 
in the waters of Viet-Nam and the Philippines as well as 
Indonesia. There are conflictina claims of sovereignty 1n 
some of these areas, such as the Spratleys and the East China 
Sea north of Taiwan, which have inhibited development even 
though much of the affected area is under lease. When those 
disputed claims are resolved, and admitting that in some cases 
th1s may take years, development will proceed and the 
benefits to the ent1re world will be immense. 
If, as I believe is the case, Japan's confidence 1n its 
partnership with the United States is based heavily on 1ts 
perception of our role in East Asia as a whole, what the 
Japanese have seen over the past year could not have been 
entirely reassur1ng. The problem, I am conv1nced, 1s one of 
perception rather than of reality. I would argue, and have so 
argued in many conversations in Japan, that there has been no 
lessening of the importance this nation attaches to its ties 
with Japan and to its role in East Asia generally. Put there 
is no doubt that we have at times given an impression of 
indirection and inconsistency. We have muddied the waters. 
This was probably an 1nevitable by-product of a transition in 
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the United States as sharp as any since World War II. I, of 
course, am of the view that that transition was a healthy phe-
nomenon, representing as it did a vitally necessary political 
renewal in this country. But it has had its disquieting side 
effects in our relations with Asia. In emphasizing change, we 
may have placed insufficient stress on the important elements 
of continuity in our policies. 
I believe our task is to reaffirm the major elements of a 
well defined and widely understood Asian policy, while making 
the adjustments necessary to insure consistency with changing 
circumstances. Some of these adjustments are highly important, 
reflecting the determination of this Administration to construc t 
a foreign policy fully in accord with American values and wh i ch 
will elicit the broadest possible popular support. At t he same 
time, the basic thrust of our policy toward the reg ion is and 
should remain unchanged - - we see ourselves, correctly , as a 
major participant in the affairs of East Asia. Japan is 
engaged in something more fundamental -- tailoring its fore ign 
policy to its position as a major world power, defining its 
role vis-a-vis its principal communist neighbors, Southeast 
Asia, Europe, and the rest of the world. In so d6ing, · Japan 
continues to see its ties with the United States as the essen-
tial foundation upon which to build the structure of its 
worldwide diplomacy. 
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Japan's prospects for continued success, in an uncertain 
world, are good. The industry and talents of its people are 
limitless. But Japan faces serious problems as well, 
particularly in the economic area. Americans, and Japan's 
other trading partners, sometimes tend to overestimate its 
strengths. We look at huge trade surpluses, astounding 
productivity, high growth rates, low levels of unemployment 
and we feel a mixture of awe, envy, frustration and hostil1ty . 
For their part, the Japanese tend to focus too sharply on 
their weaknesses. Despite their phenomenal economic success 
of the last quarter century and their rank as the world's 
third largest economy, the Japanese think of themselves as a 
small, exceed1ngly vulnerable society, hostage far more than 
other advanced nations to forces beyond their control -- o1 l 
embargoes, recession, protectionism. The Japanese have thus 
been slow to recognize that their economic power imposes 
responsibilities, that other nations as well as they are 
vulnerable, that leadership rather than mere participation 
is called for. Perceptions, ours of Japan and Japan's of us, 
are out of phase, and perceptions as much as realities shape 
international relationships. That much was evident in look1ng 
back over the past year. 
It is important to recall that a year ago there were not 
one but two new governments managing the US-Japan relat1onsh1p . 
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When Vice President Mondale arrived in Tokyo on the last day 
of January 1977 he was representing a government one week old 
to one that was all of one month old. While our transition 
was a bit more sweeping than theirs, the fact is there was new 
leadership in Tokyo as well as in Washington, and each 
administration was to some extent an unknown quant1ty to the 
other. There was no dearth of issues to address -- preemi-
nently Korea, nuclear nonproliferation policy, and economic 
questions -- and all were to one degree or another affected by 
the newness of the governments dealing with them on both sides 
of the ocean. 
The Japanese were disturbed when a withdrawal of ground 
troops from Korea emerged as a tenet of President Carter's 
foreign policy during the campaign, and when the Vice President 
reaffirmed it during his visit a week after the inaugurat1on. 
The Japanese were bothered by the substance of the decision 
questioning whether withdrawal could take place without up· 
setting stability on the peninsula and endangering regional 
security. They were perhaps even ~ore concerned by the abrupt 
manner in which,in their eyes, the decision appeared to have 
been taken . I happen to believe the decision was correct 
a wise and judicious measure which fundamentally is an exten-
sion of a policy of careful, gradual withdrawal of ground 
combat forces dating back to 1969. 
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The Japanese now understand that we have in mind a program 
of carefully phased withdrawal accompanied by measures to 
strengthen our remaining a~T forces and South Korean forces, 
and I believe they understand as well that this withdrawal does 
not portend any diminution of our commitment to the security of 
the Republic of Korea. But all this was not clear at first. 
Perhaps we had not taken sufficient pains to make ourselves 
fully understood; and certainly press treatment of the issue, 
in this country and in Japan, was not always accurate and well 
reasoned. In any event, the perceived abruptness of our action 
for a time undermined Japanese confidence in the constancy of 
American policy toward the most crucial security issue in Asia. 
While the problem with Korean troop withdrawal from the 
Japanese perspective was its seeming precipitousness, the Tokai 
Mura issue seemed to Japanese observers to reflect at the out-
set a too doctrinaire American approach to an exceedingly 
complicated issue. Japan, as you all know, is second to none 
in its abhorrence of nuclear weapons. But as a nation with few 
energy resources, it is also second to none in its desire to 
exploit the productive potential of peaceful nuclear power. 
It sees nuclear industry -- and the development of a so-called 
full fuel cycle, including reprocessing of spent fuel to extract 
plutonium for use in breeder reactors -- as the only realistic 
means for Japan to achieve a modicum of energy self- sufficiency. 
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Thus, Tokai Mura, Japan's pilot reprocessing plant, had become 
something of a symbol in Japan. 
When we announced in April, two months before Tokai Mura 
was to begin operation, that the United States would forego 
reprocessing and would encourage other nations to do the same, 
we had in mind a worldwide policy affecting all nations equally 
and to which all nations of good will could subscribe. Japan , 
and our European allies, saw it somewhat differently. For 
Japan in particular it caused serious problems. Not only would 
it have meant the abandonment of Tokai Mura and delays in 
Japan's nuclear industry development while alternatives to 
reprocessing were pursued, it also threatened perhaps irrepara-
ble damage to the national consensus which had been painstakingly 
built up in support of a nuclear industry. Moreover, it seemed 
potentially discriminatory -- while we could only encourage 
the Europeans to forego reprocessing, we could, under the terms 
of our bilateral nuclear agreement, forbid i~ in the case of 
Japan. 
But the problem was solved -- and I regard its resolution 
as perhaps the single most significant achievement in US-Japan 
relations in this past year. Ambassador Gerard Smith -- and 
the President, who took a personal interest in this issue --
deserve immense credit. Intensive negotiations addressing 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 32, Box 1, Folder 16          , Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 12 -
both the political and technical aspects of the issue and 
extending from April through September resulted in an agreement 
meeting the essential needs of both sides -- Japan's for an 
early startup of Tokai Mura, ours for a solution consistent 
with a more effective nonproliferation regime. The agreement 
reflected true compromise, and undoubtedly strengthened rather 
than weakened the prospects for broad international agreemdnt 
on an alternative to conventional reprocessing. The reproces-
sing issue is now being studied and debated in an internatlonal 
context, where it properly belongs. 
More compllcated, more intractable, and less susceptlble 
of tidy solution than Tokai Mura are the complex of economlc 
issues confronted in our relations with Japan over the 
past year: 
Japan's huge worldwide current account surplus; 
Japan's massive surplus in our bilateral trade; 
Japan's reputation, much of it deserved, as a 
restricted market for imports; 
pressures in specific sectors of the American 
economy attributed to Japanese competition. 
The latter category -- what the economists call sectoral 
trade problems -- have seemed relatively more manageable. 
While extremely complicated, they at least are finite. 
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Two such problems were especially prominent during the past 
year -- color television imports and steel. A rapid increase 
in the sales of Japanese color TV sets in 1976 caused deep 
concern within the US electronics industry and prompted calls 
for government action to redress the situation. Bob Strauss 
took this on as one of the first major problems with wh1ch he 
contended as the President's Special Trade Representative. 
He and the Japanese got together on several occasions, and 
through persistence, imagination and abundant good will -- the 
latter always being the indispensable ingredient -- an agree-
ment was reached which places reasonable limits on the export 
to this country of Japanese color TV sets. 
The second major sectoral problem was in the steel indus-
try. Earlier in the year, we reached an agreement which placed 
limits on specialty steel imports. The industry's broader 
problems were addressed more recently by the Solomon Committee 
recommendations establishing a formula intended to insure fa1r 
pricing in a variety of steel products. 
In respect to steel, the Japanese recognized months ago 
that something needed to be done and indicated they would try 
to cooperate in whatever solution we might propose. They had 
a considerable wait while we ~igured out what to do. ~e were 
without a steel policy for too long a time. I am hopeful that 
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our solution -- the reference price system -- will work and 
I commend Under Secretary Solomon for the creativity and 
vision of his efforts. It should be noted, however, that 
this system is, of course, only a stopgap measure pending a 
more permanent solution in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations . 
I think I also should point out an often overlooked aspect of 
the steel problem: that European producers, as much as Japan's 
- - and in recent months more than Japan's -- have also made 
life difficult for our industry. We ought not be quick in 
blaming other people for our problems -- but if we are allo-
cating blame at all, we should at least do it evenly. 
I do not claim that OMAs, or VRAs, or reference price 
systems are fully consistent with the principles of free trade. 
But one can argue that in an era of worldwide recession, mone-
tary imbalance, and economic adjustment, such measures are 
valid temporary solutions -- and indeed support free trade 
ideals by forestalling what would otherwise be irresistable 
pressures for permanent protectionist solutions. 
The larger aspects of these economic problems -- our 
limited access to Japan as a market and Japan's huge global 
current account surplus have been addressed intermittently 
throughout the year. Our dialogue on these issues began with 
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the Vice President's visit last January, and continued at a 
high level with Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to Washington 
in March and the participation of both leaders in the London 
Economic Summit in May. They were a matter of almost daily 
contact at the expert level throughout the spring and summer. 
By the late summer, when it became apparent that projections 
made earlier in the year would not hold up, our efforts -- and 
Japan's --were stepped up. 
In September we and the Japanese began a process of 
consultation -- not confrontation -- as intensive and far 
reaching as any we have had with Japan, or perhaps with any 
other country, on any issue. Those consultations, including 
the visit here on Minister Ushiba in December, concluded with 
a visit by Ambassador Strauss to Tokyo in mid-January. It is 
fitting that this round -- and it is only a round, we all 
recognize that -- ended with Bob Strauss's visit. More than 
any other individual on our side, it was Bob Strauss who 
worked with Minister Ushiba and his colleagues in the Japanese 
Government to produce a highly satisfactory outcome. Looking 
at it from my point of view, I would say that while we were 
not always totally consistent in our approach, we certainly 
did not lack persistence -- and the results were good: 
Japan (our largest agricultural customer by far, w1th 
purchases approaching $4 billion a year) has agreed 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 32, Box 1, Folder 16          , Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 16 -
to increase its imports of agricultural products 
from the United States, in the face of strong oppo-
sition from its own farming industry; 
Japan has indicated its intention to seek a domestic 
economic growth rate in 1978 of 7 percent, and has 
taken concrete measures to fulfill that goal; 
Japan has allowed a sharp appreciation of the yen , 
which should over time be reflected in its trade 
balance, even though this has endangered many domest1c 
businesses; 
Japan has reaffirmed its commitment to the MTN, and 
in advance has lowered its tariffs on products impor-
tant to the United States, including cars and computers; 
Japan has indicated it will exercise restraint in 
its export policies and that it will in a variety of 
specific ways seek to open its own market to foreign 
products; 
Japan has acknowledged that the eventual result of 
these measures should be a sharp reduction 1n its 
surplus or even equilibrium in its overall current 
account balance. 
The ultimate effect of these efforts by Japan will not be 
evident for some months. But what is evident now, and what 
American observers of these issues should appreciate, is that 
the steps Japan has dec1ded to take entail genuine sacrif1ce, 
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painful adjustment in wide sectors of its economy, and 
significant political risk. They were not easy or empty 
concessions. Just as these economic problems impact d1rectly 
on local communities and specific interest groups in the 
United States, creating strong pressures for favorable solutions 
which are reflected in and amplified by the Congress, so 1t i s 
in Japan. Many sectors of the Japanese economy are in t r ouble; 
the J apanese Di et represents and defends the position of con-
stituents who f eel themselves threatened by American "demands . " 
Thus, in the context in which they were taken, these were bold 
measures by the Japanese Government. We, and our European 
colleagues, must give Japan full credit. 
I am optimistic. I know that the steps we and the J a panese 
Government have agreed upon are genuine ~nd not merely cosmet1c 
in nature, and I am convinced they are going to show results. 
More important perhaps, I know the determination and t he c om-
mi tment both governments bring to these issues; if solutions 
are possible -- and, of course, they are -- we are going to find 
them and apply them. 
A word of caution is in order, however. No matter how 
effective all of our efforts prove to be, they are not going 
to solve the world's economic problems. Even if all goes as 
planned in the US-Japan economic relationship, dysfuncti on in 
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the US and world economies will remain. The problems are 
global and solutions must be global. The first major step 
toward a permanent global solution must be a restoration of 
general business confidence and a successful conclusion this 
summer to the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions in Geneva. Japan and we are committed to that goal. 
Nor can even a successful windup of the MTN insure an end 
to our problems. The single most important source of our trou-
bles is not being addressed in Geneva. I refer to our own 
massive oil bill. The United States is the world's greatest 
user, greatest waster and greatest importer of 011. So long 
as we spend $45 billion per year -- or 30 percent of our total 
import bill -- buying foreian oil, our economy and the world 
economy will be out of kilter. Only we are to blame and only 
we can find a solution. ~e need an energy program. The 
President has proposed one; it is time for the Congress to act 
on it. 
When one considers the problems we have faced -- none 
of them of our making, even though I have suggested we may have 
made one or two of them temporarily worse -- we have gotten 
through the past year in relatively good shape. MaJor problems 
either are resolved or under control. An atmosphere of trust 
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and confidence has been restored. Personal relationships at 
all levels are cordial. Thus, the structure for problem 
solving is intact and functioning. For years, people within 
the government have spoken of the impressive capacity of the 
US-Japan relationship to manage difficult issues, and have 
suggested that this was in fact the truest measure of the 
strength of the relationship. If that is true, I would say 
1977 proved that our ties are in pretty good shape. We didn't 
get the best of every one of our problems, but at least we 
didn't let those problems get the best of us. So long as we 
emphasize candor and cooperation, steering clear of confronta-
tion, we will be all right in the future as well. I think the 
outlook is good. 
I want to leave you with one other thought. For years I 
have contended that Americans ought to look west -- all the 
way to the Far East -- that we have never made adequate efforts 
to understand Asia, and that without understanding Asia we are 
bound to make some serious mistakes in Asia. Our history 
unfortunately demonstrates this is so. When we do pay attention 
to the region it often is for the wrong reason, and it often is 
superficial. Our own ethnic and cultural heritage is predom-
inantly European and, important though our ties with other 
regions are, we continue to have a European bias when we as a 
nation view the world. This is a perception we must work to 
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change. Asia must loom larger in our national consciousness: 
Our trade with East Asia reached almost $60 billion 
in 1977. 
Japan is our largest overseas trading partner: 
our two-way trade carne to nearly $29 billion last year . 
Our direct capital investment in East Asia now exceeds 
$15 billion, and it is growing rapidly. 
Japan is a vital, democratic society in a world 
widely hostile to democratic values; ours is 
truly an alliance of ideals. 
Our role in East Asia -- political, economic and 
strategic -- is an essential element in the maintenance 
of peace, stability and progress in that region and 
serves American interests no less vital than those 
at stake in Europe. 
Yet far too few Americans take time to really attempt 
to understand Japan or Asia. So long as this is so, our 
perceptions as a nation will be faulty, our judqmcnts skewed. 
The Japan Society and other similar groups across the country 
have as their goal increased understanding at all levels 
between this country and the nations of Asia. I commend you 
for your efforts to date, and I wish you well in the future. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 32, Box 1, Folder 16          , Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 21 -
The results of those efforts won't show in next year's trade 
balance, but they may ultimately result in a more balanced 
American appreciation of where our true interests lie. 
* * * 
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